

Modern Interpretations of the Unconscious

by Charles H. Griffitts

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Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of the University of Kansas for
the Degree of Master of Arts.

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Prof. Harald Hoffding, in "Problems of Philosophy", gives the four main problems of philosophy as: nature of consciousness, validity of knowledge, nature of being, and values. But he believes they may be reduced to one underlying problem, to be found "in the significance which the relation between continuity and discontinuity bears to each of these problems". The establishment of a universal continuity, resting on identity, has been the dream of most philosophers, including Hoffding, who though hopeful finds the problem still unsolved. If man could leave himself out of the question it might be simplified. But as it is, man can never establish the continuity of the universe until he can establish the unity of his own nature. Here he meets two great difficulties, the mind-body problem, and the question of the unity of the mind. Hoffding wants to correlate the physiological series with the psychical, but sees the difficulty of correlating the first in which there is continuity with the second in which there is discontinuity, at least apparently. There are numerous gaps or breaks in consciousness, which he nevertheless hopes will someday be filled with psychical terms.

Ward says that if they are filled in it must be

done by turning to the subconscious, although he warns against making it a sort of catch-all for all that we cannot otherwise explain. There is a danger of considering a problem solved as soon as we have it named, but such tendency has been but little manifest in the search after the explanation of the unconscious. Without entering into a quarrel over terms, we can say that whether or not there be gaps in the psychical process, or in pure consciousness, there are at least gaps in the contents of conscious processes, unless, perchance, we choose to make the term consciousness universal, in which case there remain the gaps in the personal consciousness, which amounts to the same thing as far as we are concerned. These are the breaks or gaps that the theories of the unconscious are trying to fill. Of these breaks we may distinguish three general broad classes, which will be but named here: the subconscious factors, (1) in attention, perception, memory, etc.; (2) in the connection and arrangement of the contents of consciousness; and (3) in amnesias, lapses of memory, double personalities. Under this come also instincts, reflex acts, habits, etc., as a possible division of the subject. It is quite generally believed or assumed that the physical processes present an unbroken series. It

is possible, however, that we may some day learn that such a statement is not true.

It is not a solution of these problems to say that the psychical gaps are to be filled in with physical terms, nor to deny that they lie within the realm of psychology. The purpose of psychology is to establish the continuity of the processes with which it deals. Psychology must have as its goal the establishment of the continuity of the process which produces the so-called 'intellectual result, or else it is not properly named psychology. A psychical state either arises out of its own kind or else is produced by something else. There must be a 'cause', or a connecting link somewhere. So even though physiology and biology seduce many of our best psychologists to a field by no means barren, still that does not effect the solution of the problem at hand unless it be to strengthen the challenge. The gaps must be filled in.

After a consideration of the necessity of filling in the gaps in the conscious mental processes, the perusal of such works as those of Prof. Jastrow or Dr. Prince, or a study of the work of the psychoanalysts, the student of the subject may begin to wonder why the subject is so much ignored by psychologists, especially

by those in America. He may be rather surprised to find Prof. Münsterberg opening a chapter in his "Psychotherapy" on the subconscious, with the sweeping statement that the "story of the subconscious may be told in three words, there is none".

If therefore becomes clear that there is either a great misunderstanding, or a great diversity of opinion, or more probably a mixture of the two. In general three causes enter more or less in the rejection of the unconscious by psychologists. 1. General mistrust and the suspicion of fraud, as of some superstition, or something supernatural. 2. Terminology, and 3. the assumptions and presuppositions which the different psychologists have taken as the starting point of their science.

I. Many are prejudiced against the subconscious because of the unscientific method of many of those who use the terms most freely, such at least as the cruder spiritualists, psychical researchers, etc., who also often use many such terms as mental, conscious, unconscious, or subconscious, indiscriminately. Perhaps the height of this distrust is reached by Münsterberg, who says that he would not believe the things claimed as facts by the Society of Psychical Research were he to see them with

his own eyes. Even if he could not detect any fraud or assign any other explanation, he demurs that he would be easily fooled. The sensationalists in general are very naturally as distrustful of the claims of the advocates of the wider mental realm as is Munsterberg, and we are compelled to say not without some reason.

II. One half the difficulties James Ward believes "in the way of its (the subconscious) acceptance are due to our faulty terminology" (Ency. Brit. "Psy."). The confusion of tongues puts the problem on a plane with that confronting the children of Babel. There is no consensus of opinion either of the word to be used to designate the field of phenomena under discussion, or of the names to be assigned to the solutions offered for the problem. The confusion is doubled by the fact that we have generally fallen into the error of using the same word to designate the problem which we also apply to the particular theory offered. Also the same word may be used to apply to different problems, or fields of phenomena, or to very diverse solutions for them. When you pick up a book or a magazine article headed by some term like "The Subconscious", "The Unconscious", it is impossible to judge from the heading what may be contained in the

the article. The use of the term "Unconscious", made familiar by European writers, especially including, J.W.F. Myers, Van Hartmann. and as used by Bergson, seems clear enough, but when a person trained in that usage of the word picks up Dr. Prince's article or book on the unconscious, he will have to readjust his terminology, and use the word in a new sense almost directly opposite to the old, changing from the spiritualistic to a possible materialistic meaning. Dr. Prince makes the term subconscious the inclusive term dividing it into the unconscious (neurograms) and the co-conscious. This is a very acceptable scheme or solution for a person who agrees with Dr. Prince in his theories. But a person who has a different theory than Dr. Prince finds himself with all the terms in use already appropriated by an opposing theory. Prof. James would have a hard time stating what he means if he accepted Dr. Prince's division of terms.

The term subconscious is even more loosely used. One common usage is that as given it by James, or McDougall, as the part of the living mental personality not present in consciousness, or that part of the mental processes not present in consciousness. But this theory is strenuously opposed by those who, for various reasons insist on an arbitrary identification of mind and conscious-

ness, who nevertheless go on to propose another theory, but still head their essays as treatises of the subconscious, meaning something altogether different. This would be all right if by the subconscious they meant only to designate the field or the problem, but they in fact make no such distinction, but use the term indiscriminately for the field of phenomena, and for the different theories offered in solution. So it may mean either the unconscious part of mental activity of a single self; the detached bits of consciousness lying outside the personal consciousness (the panpsychist view), or it may be used as meaning the working or existence of another self, auxiliary to "our self", a view that in every individual there is a double personality. So to speak of the unconscious or the subconscious, without defining what is meant, is either to convey no meaning at all, or else to run the risk of being altogether understood. The author may be astonished at the interpretation given to his words.

The term 'consciousness' itself, which has a very definite meaning for the unsophisticated seems to lose its meaning if too closely studied. We know very well what is meant when we say that a person is unconscious. But some will insist that the limp body may be full of consciousnesses, a difficulty arising from the identification

of the psychical with consciousness. The double aspect view solves the problem by adroitly extending the term consciousness to cover the whole field and then turns around and divides it into personal and unpersonal consciousness, meaning only by personal consciousness what the common man means by consciousness, and by the rest what may be called anything from mechanics to dissociated personalities. Dr. Prince is consistent in applying the term co-consciousness rather than subconsciousness to this field of psychic activity, as he interprets it, but he makes a mistake when he uses the term subconscious as a term covering this co-conscious, and the unconscious which is limited to the physical.

This Babel is extremely discouraging to the person beginning a study of the subject, unless he chooses to begin by allying himself rigidly to one or another of the various positions. If he does this he will no doubt be satisfied by the terms in use as he uses them, as long as he does not care for any terms to use in the discussion of other theories. It is not without good reasons that outsiders accuse psychologists and philosophers of making great problems for themselves by a profound juxtaposition of words. It is no wonder that philosophy is so often

regarded as sickening by the concrete minded, practical man of affairs. But nevertheless the problem of philosophy and psychology are of extreme interest and of vital importance to everybody if they can be once stripped from the greetsmothering fungus network of meaningless abstractions so far as the vital life of man in society is concerned. The problem of the unconscious or the subconscious is one such problem.

It is almost with disgust that this discussion of the use of terms is written, but it seems necessary. We all have our use of terms, our biases and prejudices, most of which we are not conscious of. Those who agree with Prince will use his terms, or with James will use his, etc. Time alone, and greatly increased knowledge of the field studied, will give us a common terminology. So while a division of terms will now be given it is not meant or hoped that it be accepted by any one else, but only that the use made of them in this paper may be clear, with some hints of the reasons for making the division I have made.

To begin with it seems as though the whole terminology which has grown up is unfortunate. In discussing theories offered for the solution of other problems we do not often find such a confusion, and the reason

largely lies in the way which we hyposticise the term we use in dealing with "the subconscious". For example, in discussing the problem of the mind and body action, we would be hooted out of court if we began speaking of "the problem of ~~T~~he ~~I~~nteraction ", or of "the ~~P~~arallel", or of "the ~~E~~piphenomenon", or again if we, in addition to begging the question in the naming of the question, we began talking about "the ~~P~~arallel" as filling in the gulf between the physical and the psychical, or of "the interaction" as some separate entity by which the problem may be solved. But there is as much reason for quarreling over the reality or objective existence of these relations as separate entities as there is of any other. We are continually trying to make metaphysical or concrete entities out of abstractions.

We are clear as long as we find words on which we can use the magic "istic" or "al". To speak of the interactionistic view of the mind-body relation is to speak clearly, and also to leave room for the discussion of other theories: not so if we start out by calling the mind-body question the problem of the "Interaction", and then argue as to the existence of the interaction.

In the first place it is essential that we keep clear the distinction between the realm of facts for

which we are seeking an explanation and the theories offered as explanations. Two divisions have been considered. The first is merely to speak of the problem of the unconscious as the problem of the breaks in the contents of conscious processes, and then to designate the theories offered as those of the non-conscious interpretation (the physical nerve dispositions and activity). Second, of the co-conscious theory of Prince, and third, of the subconscious explanation, distinct from the other two. This would be much better than that offered by Dr. Prince because it does not exclude any of the theories from the discussion as Dr. Prince's does, leaving no place for the third in our division. One difficulty in this division is that we seek some word to designate the phenomena under discussion.

It has seemed advisable for several reasons that if we must have one word for the field, that we call the problem the field of the unconscious, as that seems the best word to use if we are not to beg the question of the explanation in the beginning. So we shall use the term unconscious to apply to those gaps or breaks in the conscious contents. In so doing we may make a broad provisional use of the word, so that it will not conflict

with any one of the three theories offered, should any of them be finally established. All that is meant by the term is that the phenomena it stands for are not manifested in our personal consciousness, Then if we finally decide that they are nevertheless mental, the term will apply. It will also be in order if we accept the physiological interpretation. What is meant is only to find in it a convenient means of referring to the field in question. The only difficulty will be when the panpsychist may well urge that we have not been fair to him because he claims that the phenomena are not "unconscious" but "un-personal-conscious", a difficulty brought on by his use of the term consciousness. So in using the term unconscious we must keep this reservation in mind, or else not use it and speak of the question of the discontinuities of consciousness, which is really much the better thing to do. In this discussion the unconscious will mean just that, never any theory offered as an explanation or description. Now as to the rest of the difficulty, which is now more than half solved in separating the problem from the solutions.

These theories as we have seen, are offered. 1. The physiological, materialistic, non-psychic, non-mental. 2. The co-conscious, disconnected bits of consciousness.

3. Subconscious, submerged part of the one mental process. The only difficulty may arise in the case of the first and there only if we try to use the term unconscious, which at first looks like the very thing to do. As before noted that would be flying in the face of past uses of the term. One temptation lies in the tendency to make a division in three similar terms like the unconscious, co-conscious, and subconscious. The third could well be called the psychical were it not that the difficulty would arise of disposing of the second in such a scheme, which claims to be psychical, but in which the explanation is based so directly on physiology. In other words the general theory back of it, the double aspect view, would deny the division of physical and psychical, and claim both or neither.

This only shows some of the difficulties.

Perhaps the most essential thing is to cease making an arbitrary distinction of mind and consciousness, and even though firmly convinced that such a statement represents the truth, we should be willing to let the proof rest rather on empirical investigation than on any dogmatic assumption. Some may claim that this will mean the ruination of psychology, but it seems that the

only thing ruined, if anything, will be the particular assumptions upon which some choose to build, which assumptions are often made only to be forgotten as soon as the serious discussion of the data of science commences. If we wish to limit psychology to the analysis of conscious facts, that is no reason for claiming that all the facts which may unexpectedly confront us must also be included under the category of conscious facts. Why not gracefully admit the possibility of new factors having arisen since the first assumptions were made and that now in the light of these new facts, our definitions must be revised? I see few reasons why this cannot be done without abandoning the whole field and deserting to biological behaviorism. We have been trying to let an early definition set the limit now, and in order to find a way to consider factors unheard of when the definition was made, we have considered ourselves under the strict necessity of bringing all under the head of conscious phenomena. Psychology studies consciousness, they say. These new facts must be considered, therefore they must be considered as being conscious. There is one alternative, open to those who wish to identify mind and consciousness.

The other way in which these troublesome mental phenomena may be disposed of is to say that they do not belong to psychology at all, but rather to physiology, assuming such a wise division between the two sciences that what belongs to physiology can in no way be considered in psychology. "Facts are deferred to the subconscious mind which do not belong to mind at all,---but are simply processes in the physical organism," says Münsterberg. (Psychotherapy, p. 130). This only shows the straits to which such an identification of terms will lead one.

I see no reason why the introspectionist should need to claim that what he introspectively observes is the whole process. The day may be coming when we can assume a psychical instead of a physical substrate for consciousness. Beneath the physical world as we perceive it lies some common basis which we in our ignorance call matter. Back of the appearances or aspects, lies the true reality of this 'matter' which we never perceive. Now what is to hinder us from supposing that the psychical phenomena of which we are conscious are also grounded in some reality the essence of which, like that of matter, is hid from us? Nothing. In fact we are compelled to do so. The question is whether we make the substrate beneath the physical phenomena serve also as the substrate of con-

scious phenomena. Are they both appearances of the same fundamental reality or have they different bases?

As it is now those psychologists who various reasons identify mind and consciousness look at the problem of the subconscious interpretation of the difficulty as some phantasm which, even if only admitted to discussion would speedily destroy all that has ever been accomplished by psychology. If we accept it, Titchener says, "we voluntarily leave the sphere of fact for the sphere of fiction" (Psychology, P. 40). This tendency is more noticeable among the American psychologists. The result is that one will see nothing in mental phenomena but consciousness where another sees every where the manifestations of a subconscious mental activity. Munsterberg looks over the disputed field and says that, "even if we welcome facts of the widest limits there can be no doubt that the subconscious is never among them". (Symposium P.16). Jastrow, Freud, or Prince look over the same phenomena and see direct evidence every where of the subconscious. There have been many fierce disputes which have been ended when the adversaries have found themselves talking in different terms about the same thing, and having discovered this, have often found themselves in complete accord. Many of the difficulties

of getting at the heart of the matter of the interpretation to be made of the unconscious, are of this same sort, and will largely settle themselves as soon as we are familiar enough with the problem to agree on a common terminology. Perhaps a better knowledge will suggest an entirely new terminology free from all ambiguity, or achieve the same end by ~~a~~modification of the ones we now have.

Much of the confusion has been indirectly due to the fact that psychology with its faulty terminology concerning the different levels and aspects of consciousness and behavior has left this field of discovery to those who were not versed in even this faulty terminology, but whose work has proven so valuable and pertinent to psychology that psychologists have been compelled to take note of it. It is significant as Dr. Schofield says, that while the general run of physicians may not, yet the masters of the science have almost invariably given the mind a large place in the practice of medicine. They claim to find the working of a psychic principle, below the level of consciousness, which cannot be accounted for in physiological or chemical terms. They have found that the only way to treat many diseases, especially of the mind, or some of the so-called nervous disorders, is through the

the mind itself, and not through drugs. And still we want to base everything on physiology in order to be scientific. And what should such a physician think if he were told by Titchener, that while he is talking in terms of common-sense interactionism, he must be careful to think in terms of parallelism.

It is not enough to accuse a physician of not knowing what he is talking about when he talks of "unconscious mental processes", for it is possible that he is talking about something with which psychology ought to be familiar if it is to serve humanity, but is in trouble only when he tries to state the results of his researches in psychological terms. Let us be glad that they are at work accomplishing results while we are busy trying to catalog them.

We have seen that many factors have entered into the present difficulty over terms. There has been a confusion of the problem with the theories offered, the same term being used for each case, but a different term selected for that double use by different people: that it is also due to making the same word serve in such different, or even opposing meanings: that the historical development along different lines have

been partly accountable for this: that much valuable work has been written without making a careful choice of words; and that probably the most general cause has been the tendency to regard all such terms as consciousness, mind, psychical as having identical meanings. Several reasons lie back of this tendency which will be studied later.

Now it may seem that the time given to this question of terms has been entirely out of proportion to its importance, but I must confess that the greatest obstacle I had to overcome in my study of the subject so far , has been this very question of trying to find out what an author has meant by his particular usage of the terms. It is disconcerting to find Munsterberg disposing of the subconscious by saying that there is none, and then giving almost the same explanation to some of the phenomena under discussion, particularly the abnormal, as Prince makes, who believes firmly that which he often names the subconscious, Under which he includes both types of explanation offered by Munsterberg. Nearly all of what Munsterberg applies to a subconscious personality, or subconscious self, so that obviously, what he says has little application to the notion also called that of the subconscious by those who use it as does James or

McDougal. But it is hard to remember this when Munsterberg is making his sweeping statements about the non-existence of the subconscious, which are denied existence largely because they fail to agree with his assumptions, and not for any lack of evidence. It is a case of making the facts fit the theory instead of making the theory fit the facts. Of course he would say that psychological theory has nothing to do with the facts anyway.

III. However this may be, we must not suppose that there are no deeper problems at the bottom of the dispute over the subconscious. While the confused use of terms has caused many misunderstandings, and much waste of effort in misplaced attacks, still the chief factor in producing the different theories, and in their acceptance has been the different attitude from which the problem has been approached. It is inevitable that we should interpret new facts in the light of our more firmly fixed viewpoint. These assumptions and presuppositions are of two general classes, the metaphysical, generally submerged and held in the back ground of our thinking, and the methodological, or our assumptions as to the proper limits of science, and as to the methods

to be used. While it is not the business of psychology to discuss these metaphysical positions, still they should be more readily recognized in the results they produce in our thinking. This is especially important in reading the writings of a writer who starts from such a position as that held by Münsterberg. Perhaps the happy day is coming when our psychology will not be so dependent on our metaphysics, and when we will no longer be required to ask whether a statement is made as a psychologist or as a man, whether it applies to real life or only to science.

It is hardly necessary to dwell at length on the question of these different positions or how they affect the different treatments of the unconscious. The materialists, the dualists (and the adherents of the Double-aspect view), and the spiritualists, will treat the question in the light of their general positions. The materialist will arrive at the first, the dualist at the second, and the spiritualist at the third, of the different explanations of the unconscious.

IV When we come to the question of the standpoint and methods we come to a more openly avowed problem. We find those who would reduce psychology to ~~psychology~~ ^{physiology},

or to biology, and others who would use physiology merely as a starting point from which to depart to the analysis of conscious experiences, but still maintaining that their work can be properly called scientific only so long as this strained position is maintained.

Others claim that psychology should be more a study of the real life, of the ideals and values affecting the conduct of the individual. They want to study the psychic life of man as it is, without any transformations. Psychology without a soul, or without consciousness, is like a play of Hamlet with Hamlet left out. (Calkins). Of this division the first will generally support the first two theories of the unconscious, the latter the third.

C. Division of theories as to Standpoint and Method

We have found the three theories offered as solutions of the unconscious, and two general standpoints, the physiological and the mental. The last two theories admit the presence of a psychic factor, which the first denies. But while the second admits the presence of a psychic factor, it believes this psychic phenomena to be a consciousness detached from the main stream, accompanied with a separation of physical functioning, by which it is generally 'explained'. It does nothing to establish the continuity of the mental series, conscious or unconscious. It implicitly denies such a continuity, which it finds only in the physiological processes, nerve dispositions, or 'neurograms'. The first two are generally parallelists by profession, although the parallelism is nearly always one sided, a means of avoiding any interaction between body and mind in one direction only. An avowed parallelist will talk continually of the affect of nerve excitation upon consciousness. The double-aspect advocate gives the same sort of explanation as the one just noted and also falls into the error of explaining one of the aspects by the other. They find one aspect where the other is lacking. The inseparable are separated. (see Prince, "Unconscious" p.237). The first two then are opposed to the third, offering a

physical as opposed to a psychical explanation. This because only the third regards the psychical as having any effect on the behavior in question.

Owing to his way of looking at things, the man who approaches the problem from the side of physiology and who, though admitting the mental factor in the process, endeavors to explain mental phenomena as dependent on physiology, which is in turn based on physics, will have one set of difficulties in dealing with the hypothesis of the subconscious. He must account for the different dispositions of the neurones how and why they come to be arranged as they are, and why they are sometimes accompanied by self-consciousness and sometimes not. Where others speak of the subconscious he chooses to speak of the non-psychic and non-conscious activity, or of co-conscious, dissociated or alternating personalities, to be explained by reference to dissociated functioning of nerve centers, or he may seek to avoid the question entirely by denying the continuity of the conscious processes, it being obvious that there can be no dividing of what was never united.

Those of the second division, including the animist or vitalist, escape from any of the difficulties

of the first by saying that consciousness is only a part of the psychic process, or of the organizing principle, the rest of course being that to which we apply the term subconscious, but another set of special difficulties will confront them. They will be confronted by those who fail to see the benefit to be derived from such a hypothesis and will be accused of still having a dualism between the body and mind, as well as a dualism within the mind. He will hold to the continuity of the mental processes, and when I say mental here I say it as he uses it, as including consciousness as an element. Of course they do not deny the influence of the body on the mental processes but they make the mind supreme and think more of the brain as the organ of the mind. They are generally interactionists, but not necessarily so.

It is obvious that the telepathist, spiritualist, Christian scientist, etc., will belong to this division nor should we be too hasty in passing judgement on these things. Science has been so strong in its condemnation of the people trying to establish these things that it has never made an exhaustive study of the matter itself, by substituting its own methods for the slipshod ones

now so often used.

Now by no means do I want to be understood as implying that every body is at heart either a believer in the pure mechanistic theory of life, or else in animism. What I do want to say is that which men of almost every metaphysical ^{and} epistemological creed are to be found discussing this field of phenomena, as soon as they get into the practical discussion of the subject they will be found inclining toward one or the other of the two positions.

For a clear understanding of the three positions, 1., in a non-mental, 2., in a co-conscious and 3, in a subconscious position, I have endeavored to bring together some of the opposing attitudes on different questions, The first two are on one side of the line opposing the third. While occasionally there may be an exception on some particular point, yet most if not all the treatments so far made may be placed in one or the other group. By no means will a person falling in either class occupy all the positions on that side of the line. But with any of the oppositions, the choice of one or the other side will determine whether the per-

son will end with a co-conscious or a subconscious theory, the non-mental belonging with the first.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Mind equals consciousness. Psychological, mental, and conscious are synonymous terms. | 1. Mind, or the psychological, are broader terms, including consciousness. |
| 2. Mental states are 'explained' as dependent on nerve dispositions. | 2. Nerve dispositions are dependent on the mental states, as well as vice-versa. |
| 3. Epiphenomenalism, Parallelism, or the Double aspect view. | 3. Interactionism. |
| 4. Mind is a phenomenon or accompaniment of brain activity, apart from which it has no existence. | 4. Mind has a separate existence apart from the body, or is capable of such existence. |
| 5. Telepathy impossible. (Though I fail to see how it follows, even from their premises.) | 5. Telepathy possible, or probable. Some say it has been proven. |
| 6. Phenomena under discussion are non-mental, or co-conscious. | 6. Most of the phenomena should be called the subconscious. |
| 7. Unconscious cerebration is due to purely physiological activities, with either no psychic element at all, or else accompanied by a consciousness apart from the main stream, with which it is co-conscious. | 7. So-called unconscious cerebration is due to the operation of some vital or organizing principle. |
| 8. Co-consciousness is present only in abnormal or pathological cases. | 8. Subconscious operations are a factor in nearly if not mental activity. |

The parallelists come under one or the other of the divisions, as they choose one or the other of the following opposing positions.

9. Normal unity of the mind, where mind is equivalent to consciousness. (This leads to some very peculiar positions.)

9. Normal unity of the mind, but mind includes consciousness.

10. There is no continuity of mind.

10. There may be no continuity in consciousness, but there is in the whole mental process, or in psychic activity.

A revised terminology and a more careful use of it would help much to clear away the difficulties in this last division.

Having now seen the difficulties besetting a study or discussion on a common ground, of the unconscious, as well as the difficulties in the way of reaching a common conclusion, and having also classified the different theories according to certain principles, it remains to take up these three different theories for a further and more complete discussion.

D. Discussion of the Three Theories.

I. Non-mental theory.

Strangely enough while the exponents of the non-mental or purely psychical, explanation of the unconscious phenomena claim the physiological processes explain all, we are told but little as to the particulars of the explanation. Their work is mainly negative, being concerned more with finding the difficulties of the other explanations than with giving an exposition of their own (as we all are, more or less). If a critical study of one or two apparently alternative positions shows that great difficulties are involved in such a position, the other one is often more uncritically accepted as true. This accounts for the attitude of many of those who hold to the non-mental type of theory.

Again, some assume that this is really the only explanation which can ever be scientific, that it is the only one which admits of safe and sane methods. They claim that it is demanded by science, but the quicker science learns that it must not conflict with fact, the better for it. Truth can only harm a science based on false premises. If a subconscious or a co-conscious interpretation can cause the down-fall of the whole fabric of science, true or not, then it is a worse than

useless fabric and the quicker it falls the better. I do not mean to say that the subconscious position is by any means proven, but that it is dangerous to rule any thing out or to condemn it as untrue on an a priori basis. Titchener, for example, seems to believe that the psychologist has no business with the subconscious, or any unconscious processes, except insofar as they may be explained by physiology. The following from his text-book admirably sums up his whole position:

"It is worth while, for the sake of clearness, to dwell on this point in more detail. The physical world, the world of independent experience, just because it is independent of the individual man, is complete and self-contained. All of the processes that make it up are bound together as cause and effect; nowhere is there a gap or break in their connection. Now among the processes that make up this independent world are the processes of the nervous system. These are linked as cause and effect, both to one another and also to physical processes, outside the body, which precede and follow them; they have their fixed place in the unbroken chain of physical events; they may themselves be explained, exactly as the occurrence of dew is explained. Mental processes on the other hand correspond, not to the whole

series of physical events, but to only a small part of them, namely, to certain events within the nervous system. It is natural then, that mental phenomena should appear scrappy, disconnected, unsystematic. It is also natural that we should seek their explanation in the nervous processes that run parallel to them, and whose causal connection with all the other processes of the independent world insures the continuity that they so conspicuously lack. Mind lapses every night and reforms every morning; but the bodily processes go on, in sleep and in waking. An idea drops out of memory, to recur, quite unexpectedly, many years later; but the bodily processes have been going on without interruption. Reference to the body does not add one iota to the data of psychology, to the sum of introspections. It does not furnish us with explanatory principle for psychology; it does not enable us to systematise our introspective data. Indeed, if we refuse to explain mind by body, we must accept one or the other of two equally unsatisfactory alternatives: We must either rest content with the simple description of mental experience, or must invent an unconscious mind to give continuity and coherence to the conscious. Both courses have been tried. But, if we take the first, we never arrive at a science of psychol-

ogy; and if we take the second, we voluntarily leave the sphere of fact for the sphere of fiction". (Titchener Text-Book of Psychology: Pages 39-40).

It is well to note the assumptions of this passage, upon which the whole attitude is based. He assumes that the physical world is complete, self-contained, independent. Secondly, that the causal series is complete, there being no gaps or breaks in the connections of the causal series, and that there is no causal connection in the psychical series. Thirdly, he assumes that we know more of the physical series of cause and effect than we do of the mental processes. Neither assumption is by any means proven as true. Titchener may reject the subconscious as belonging to the sphere of fiction because it is not subject to his introspection. But can he be justified in claiming that the whole mental process is subject to introspection? Does he ever introspect the real process? One thing is sure, when he gives any explanation of the unconscious he leaves the sphere of introspectionable phenomena. Why then is the physical explanation so much nearer his heart than the psychical? Because of the three unproven assumptions just noted? He may, as some do, say that it was assumed to begin with that the consciousness and mind are identical. He says:

"In its second sense, consciousness is identified with mind, and 'Conscious' with 'mental'. So long as mental processes are going on, consciousness is present; as soon as mental processes are in abeyance, unconsciousness sets in." (Text-Book Psychology Page 18).

"It is not only unnecessary but it is also misleading, to speak of consciousness as the mind's awareness of itself. The usage is unnecessary, because as we shall see later, this awareness is a matter of observation of the same general kind as observation of the external world; it is misleading, because it suggests that mind is a personal being, instead of a stream of processes. We shall therefore take mind and consciousness to mean the same thing. But as we have the two different words, and it is convenient to make some distinction between them, we shall speak of mind when we mean the sum total of processes occurring in the life-time of an individual, and we shall speak of consciousness when we mean the sum total of processes occurring now, at any given 'present' time. Consciousness will thus be a section, a division, of the mind-stream." (Text-Book Psychology: Pages 18-19).

But this assumption is first and foremost a begging of the question, is only another way of stating the same thing. It furnishes no excuse for denying mentality to

the unintrospectionable. Science must get at the truth, even though that may not be its chief end. It must be in harmony with truth and has no more grounds for assuming an unbroken physical series than an unbroken psychological series. If it is admissable to introduce physical links in the psychical series, there is no good reason for refusing to admit psychical series. A working hypothesis, recognized as such in profession and practice, is extremely valuable. But it is a different matter when we refuse to revise it as we go along. They are made as a preliminary guide, not as something to be maintained at all hazards. If the conclusions of the physicist and those of the psychologist are contradictory there must be a readjustment somewhere along the line.

Much of what has been said will apply to the position of that arch-enemy of the subconscious, Prof. Münsterberg. He makes the strongest attack on what he calls the 'subconscious mind', in the chapter on the subject in his "Psychotherapy". But it should be noted that most of what he says there applies to the conception of the 'subliminal self', or of the double personality. It is directed against the conception of a separated, coherent, organized conscious self, which divides the work with the conscious self. It has but little to do with the "

conception of the subconscious as used in this paper as the subliminal operations of a psychical process, a use similar to that made of the term by McDougal, or by James in his "Varieties of Religious Experience". While he is materialistic in his psychology, and hence offers a non-mental, or physiological explanation of the unconscious, still he has not much of a quarrel with the co-conscious explanation, which however he applies only in abnormal cases, and here only for the sake of convenience. To get a proper conception of his real position his article in the Symposium appearing in the 'Journal of Psychology' should be read before the chapter in the 'Psychotherapy'. As he is perhaps the chief representative of this non-mental explanation, I have chosen to give something of his position as representative of the group. It is interesting to note that while Munsterberg reaches his conclusions as the direct outcome of his peculiar metaphysical position and of the resulting attitude toward science in general, that yet these conclusions are considered as final by many who would very vigorously reject the premises upon which his argument is reached. It is lamentable that we must divide the statements of a man into two divisions, that in which he is speaking as a man, and that in which he is speak-

ing as a scientist, and that a statement in one case may be contradictory on the surface to a statement in the other.

Concerning the question at hand, he says: "We therefore find three types of theories, the first backed mostly by laymen, the second by physicians, the third by psychologists. Yet the lines are not to be drawn sharply. The first group says: the subconscious is a psychical system of a full real personality below the conscious person; that subconscious remembers, thinks, feels, wills, on its own accord, influences our conscious life, helps it out, shines through it, and causes the abnormal facts. The popular mind clings to such a convenient method of explanation the more closely as it is on this basis easy to bring the subconscious selves into telepathic connection or to link them with mystical agencies. The second group says: the subconscious is psychical but not a system, it is made up of ideas, but they do not at first form a personality; it is dissociated, split off mental material which only in a secondary way flow together into a new detached self. The subconscious is then not at all a regular psychical foundation but is something either pathological or at

least artificial. The third group, finally, says: the subconscious that underlies the abnormal facts is the same that underlies the ordinary processes of memory, attention, etc.; it is not psychical at all, but a physiological brain process.

"The emotional demands of the mystic, the practical demands of the physician, and the theoretical demands of the psychologist are well fulfilled by these three types of theories, and to a certain extent they can be helpful, side by side; the purpose which we have before us determines each time which of the three modes of construction is most useful for our special end." (Symposium Pages 19-20).

He really feels "inclined to take the place with the psychologists in the third group; the subconscious at all".(20). As none of these theories tell us any thing of real life he believes the only correct way of deciding is this; "which of the many constructions of the not-conscious causes is the most useful for the explanation of the observed facts?" (17). But why is this materialistic method the most useful?

He believes that in every one of these cases where the subconscious is called in that the relations can be much better expressed in physical or in neurological terms. "Psychology considers the inner experience there

fore, for its special purpose as a series of describable phenomena; it transforms the felt realities of will into perceivable objects, into contents of consciousness" (26). Any scientific treatment must be in terms of causal connection. But "this material which, through the objectification, has lost all its inner teleological ties, has not even a chance to enter into any direct causal connections. The physical phenomena can and must be conceived as causally connected, the psychological not. There cannot be causality where the objects do not last but are destroyed in the very act of their appearance: just this is characteristic of all psychological contents. The world is physical insofar as we conceive it as identical with itself in ever new experiences, and to elaborate this self-identity of the material universe is the meaning of the causal treatment. The object is psychological just in so far as it is not identical in new experiences, but is created anew in every act. Therefore there is no direct causal connection of the psychologised inner life; therefore there is only an indirect causal explanation of psychological phenomena possible in so far as they can be conceived as accompaniments of the physiological processes. In short, even the full conscious mental facts do not really hang together when viewed from

a psychological point of view and are thus unfit to explain any results through their causal interplay; they are epiphenomena, and the causal working of the objectified conscious facts goes on in the physiological sub-stratum." (Symposium, Pages 27-28).

Therefore there is no motive for conceiving a psychical fact outside of consciousness. "The dissociated idea is psychologically not existent just as the ticking of the clock in my room does not exist for me when my attention is turned to my reading; the ticking reaches my brain and may there have after-effects, but the sound sensation is inhibited. In this way all that which suggested the theory of the mental subconscious becomes simply increased or decreased inhibition. Why the mental accompaniments of certain physiological processes are some times inhibited must of course itself be explained physiologically; every thing seems to point to the relation between sensory excitement and the openness or closedness of the motor channels of discharge." (Symposium Page 30).

After all this it is hard to understand any such distinction as he makes at the close. "The physiological

psychologist thus ought carefully to avoid the language of the subliminal self theory as it flows over too easily into antiphilosophy. But he has no reason to avoid the language of the dissociated idea theory-- provided that the psychological word is taken as short label for the very complex neural physiological process. If I had to write the history of Miss Beauchamp I should conceive all subconscious processes in physiological conceptions, but I should describe them, for clearness and convenience sake, as the master of our symposium has so masterly done, in the terms of psychological language. " (Symposium, Pages 31-32).

In the beginning of the chapter in the "Psychotherapy", he is much more radical in his attacks on the subconscious as possible explanations of such phenomena as post hypnotic suggestion, or automatic writing, which explanations he characterizes as "fantasies of psychological fiction" (129). Strangely though for one who banks so largely on 'logical necessity' he wants "to turn to the concrete facts" (130). Also, "let us see them in the spirit of modern scientific psychology, let us try to explain them in harmony with the principles of psychological explanation" (130).

But he still rules out the subconscious explanation

on logical grounds. For him there is no problem in psychology of the continuity of consciousness, or of the psychological processes, mere epiphenomena. "Consciousness", he says, "is in no way active. Consciousness cannot change anything in the content nor can it connect the contents" (134). "Every change and every fusion and every process must be explained through the relations of the various contents to one another" (134). "To have psychological existence at all is to be the object of awareness for a consciousness" (134), therefore psychological objects below consciousness are impossibilities. Facts are either not mental, but physiological, or mental and not subconscious (130). Consciousness as such does not have unity, therefore cannot have a double existence; cannot be aware of itself; cannot have degrees (135). "Its whole meaning lies in being a passive spectator" (136).

After this plea for the elimination of the psychological factor from the explanation the following appears to be an almost complete retreat. The rigid methodological rules based upon rigid logical necessity have to be broken someplace along the line. "The so-called subconscious which in reality is fully in consciousness, but only unnoticed, easily shades over into that unconsciousness which is also in consciousness but dissociated from the

idea of the own personality and thus somewhat split from the interconnected mass of conscious contents" (153). He says that objects fully conscious, but not in attention are abnormal, but not subconscious (152). Disjointed personalities should be called 'co-conscious', not 'subconscious' (155). This shows that in many cases he takes the position held by the second theory, the co-conscious, or the theory of split off ideas, and that the physiological explanation hailed as all-sufficient must be dropped eventually by even its most stalwart defender. It might be well to ask what relation this split off consciousness bears to the content of the focus, in how far it effects our thinking. Münsterberg finally comes very near the subconscious, and one is almost tempted to say that under another name it would appear much more seductive to him. But we must remember that in his division of the theories, given, he leaves out altogether the conception designated by the term subconscious in this paper.

It is no purpose of mine to discuss the metaphysical position of Münsterberg any more than has already been done. But there are several things concerning the general attitude of such treatments which should be considered somewhat further than has already been done.

First it should be noted that the subconscious he attacks is that of a separate subliminal self, and therefore does not directly concern the real subconscious theory, as the terms are here used, except in regard to the general physiological position. To speak of the underground part of a tree is not to postulate the existence of a subaerial tree. It is only a continuous part, which happens not to extend above the surface. His most valid reason for rejection is given in his physical stand-point which, however, he rejects in some cases and admits co-consciousness in abnormal cases. From his physical stand-point, we might ask what is the use of such a concession?

Second: The matter of the stand-point of science is an important one for those who believe in the efficacy of the non-mental theories only. It is a question as to whether 'logical necessity', from arbitrary presuppositions, or 'empirical facts' are to be the basis of science. If a fact disagrees with our pre-supposition, which is to be retained? By all means, the latter, Munsterberg would say, because it has no validity as an interpretation of real life anyway.

Third: He also makes the unwarranted assumption noted in the case of Titchener, that we can know more of

the physical processes than we can of the mental. He finds that explanations can go only so far, but forgets that the same thing is true of physical explanations. We have as valid reasons for assuming a psychic ether, as the physicists have of assuming theirs. He forgets that there are as great or greater difficulties, even from his point of view, besetting the physiological explanation as the psychological. There are as many empirical grounds for belief in the continuity of the psychic element as of the physical. or if science is as artificial construction it would be as easy to form a coherent system of psychic objects as of the physical.

A concrete example of an instance where spiritual or vitalistic theories both comply more nearly with empirical facts, and in which the completely psychical explanation is the most useful, and least self-contradictory, is to be found in the question of sleep and dreams, a question happily avoided especially by the introspectionists, sensationalists. Psychophysicologists have offered a number of explanations each of which is either self-contradictory or contradictory to observed or experienced fact.

Sleep is a state of general inactivity of a living organism. There are any number of things which have been advanced as the cause of sleep. In the search to find a common medium, through which all these various factors work in causing the cessation of consciousness, the vaso-motor center was siezed upon, as the organ directing the flow of blood toward or away from the brain. But this, the best theory offered is open to several criticisms. There is normally always enough blood in the brain for action. Pillsbury has shown that the increase of blood flow follows some few seconds after the beginning of the activity it was supposed to create. ("Attention") So we are justified in saying that the decrease in the flow of blood to the cerebrum is the effect and not the cause. Sleep is a positive vital process, in which one of the first steps is the inhibition of the incoming stimuli, which is emphasized by Dr. Sidis.

But animals with both cerebral hemispheres removed still have their periods of activity and of repose (Richet, Loeb, Sidis). And yet all sleep theories are based upon the effects of various factors upon the cerebrum. Sleep is in some way a matter of the whole organism, and not of a single one of its parts. Loss of consciousness is only one phenomena of the sleep process. Hence consciousness must be only a part of the organic or vital processes going on in the animal.

Summary.

1. Introspectionist, or sensationalist is unconsciously lead to assume that the whole mental process is open to introspection.

2. There are no more reasons for believing in a physical ether than in a psychical ether. The same difficulties account either one, and one would be as scientific as the other. If a science is artificial it should not matter. If not it is after the truth.

3. Causal connection is as comprehensible between psychical states as between physical motions.

4. An hypothesis is made as a guide to be corrected as the facts demand, not something to be maintained at all hazards.

5. Münsterberg is one of the most influential foes of the subconscious. No one should accept his conclusions without examining his premises.

II. The Co-conscious Theory.

The second, the co-conscious interpretation of the unconscious, occupies a median position between the other two, which is the reason Münsterberg accepts it in the place of the third when he leaves the first.

Dr. Prince is the most able advocate of this position in dealing with the unconscious, and is much clearer and more definite in his exposition. He recognizes the difficulties of any treatment. He is not so prone as many to make statements at random, without any thought as to the assumptions and implications involved. His treatment will be given as an example.

Dr. Prince approaches the subject from the view of the panpsychist, but generally belongs to the first division in the classification made on pages 26 to 28 of this thesis. All mental phenomena are conscious phenomena. But there is a division of this. 1. That which is synthesized in the main original personality, and 2., that which is not, being accompaniment of the activity of a dissociated complex. A complex, which when active may be included in either of the two divisions, is, when inactive, called unconscious. It includes memory, etc., which is not functioning but lying dormant. It is

purely physical when dormant. In the Symposium he seems to say that every action of a nerve complex sets up consciousness, which may or may not appear as a part of the personal consciousness (96). A system of these dissociated nerve complexes results in a co-personality, not a sub-personality. Without physiological action there can be no consciousness, and every physiological action does produce a consciousness. He says we have as much grounds for attributing consciousness to a disposition of nerve cells in automatic writing as we have of inferring it in another person. He believes this is proven because under hypnosis, the processes some erroneously call unconsciousness, can be recalled to memory, are as the consciousness could not remember a brain state, there must have been consciousness present at the time (Symposium, Page 90).

Dr. Prince himself says in the Symposium: "And in so far as a brain process can occur detached from the main system of brain processes, so far can consciousness occur without self-consciousness. ***** Nor is self-consciousness a necessary element of consciousness. *****
 ***Indeed, even where there is absence of awareness on the part of the personal consciousness, the dissociated

co-conscious may, per contra, be aware of the content of the former. For this reason, if for no other, co-consciousness is the preferable term. ***** Those who imagine the physiological interpretation seem to me to involve themselves in difficulties far greater than any offered by the psychological interpretation. It is a fundamental interpretation of psychophysiology that all thought is correlated with physiological activities".

(98). *****"Yet with a certain modification of our conception of the meaning of the physical, it is possible to reconcile both interpretations. As a pan-psychist I find no difficulty in accepting both a physiological and a psychical interpretation. For those who accept pan-psychism there is no distinction to be made between conscious processes and brain processes of a certain order, excepting as a point of view. They become identified one with the other. The psychical is the reality of the physical. I cannot conceive of brain processes except as objective phenomena of conscious processes, and I cannot conceive of consciousness excepting as the reality or "inner life" of brain changes. So that we may indifferently describe automatic actions as manifestations of physiological activities, if we keep to one set of terms, or of psychical activities if we mix

the terms ." (Symposium, Pages 94, 95, 96, 98, 99).

Dr. Prince sometimes uses one set of terms and sometimes another, but occupies more generally the physiological side of the situation. "It may be that a final explanation of many conscious processes, if we would avoid the entanglements of metaphysics, must be in physiological terms, because it must deal with that which belongs to experience. *****However this may be, I not only say with Professor Munsterberg that 'the physiological cerebration is well able to produce the intellectual result', but ~~it~~ MUST be able to do so." (100). Here his philosophic or methodological standpoint causes him to contradict what he had just stated on page 98 of the same article.

In a series of articles in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology, on the "Unconscious", he says, "A dissociated dormant complex that cannot by any means be awakened as a conscious memory may be aroused into activity as an independent co-conscious memory" (334), evidenced in automatic writing and crystal gazing. "Aside from certain artificial and pathological conditions there is no normal subconscious self, or secondary self, or hidden self, properly speaking".

Prince, as most of us do, shifts from one side of

the question to the other. When speaking of physiology, it is the main thing, and when talking of mind, it becomes the main thing, and there is a large range of material which we will include in the one we happen to have at the time under consideration. It is easy to say at the outset that two phenomena are but two aspects of the same process, there being no causal connection, and that we will merely explain the one process by its correlate, with which we are supposed to be more familiar. But it is hard to talk long about them without speaking of one effecting the other. In discussing the co-conscious, consciousness appears as being dependent on nerve complexes. It is easy to change from saying that ideas are dependent on neural complexes, to saying that a suggested idea arouses these complexes into activity, producing the nerve-currents. He here says that the vaso-motor and secretory follow the arousal of emotions, and says that the galvanometer proves it. This offers physical proof of the influences of the mental states, whether conscious or co-conscious, on the physical processes of the body (396-397). Again he says that a complex stimulated by a word idea produces a feeling tone, which in turn effects the body. After distinguishing between physiological and psychological

processes, he draws another distinction between psychical and psychological. "A distinction should be made between psychical and psychological, these not being co-extensive and always interchangeable terms. Psychological pertains to the empirical data of consciousness (thoughts, ideas, sensations, etc.), while psychical pertains to the inner or ultimate nature of these data. Though the data as given in consciousness are psychical, that which is psychical may not be solely manifested as psychological phenomena. It may be manifested as physical phenomena, and perhaps be identified with the energy of the universe. Hence the doctrine of panpsychism. And so it may be that in its ultimate analysis an unconscious process is psychical (monism) although not manifesting itself as a datum of consciousness." The distinction is valid enough perhaps, but what becomes of the practical distinction between physiology and psychology. We are all of us prone to mix our ultimate metaphysics with our practical science.

Much light is thrown upon the coconscious theory by recognizing that it is particularly adaptable to the 'double aspect' view, or in other words, to panpsychism. This position in general agrees with the first in stating that mind and consciousness have identical meaning. To

be mental is to be conscious. They also agree generally that the double aspect operations are to be most scientifically treated in terms of the physical aspect. They would agree with Munsterberg that split off ideas are to be explained by split off nerve complexes. Why they cannot as readily say that the other or obverse relation is not as valid, is not easy to see from their premises. Practically what they do in an effort to cling to consciousness but to reject interactionism, is to go over to epiphenomenalism or materialism. The double aspect position is often only a convenient starting place, to be ignored later.

They agree with ~~the~~ third in the belief of a psychic factor in the unconscious. The difference is that it is not strictly an 'unconscious' part of the mind's operations, but split off ideas, separated consciousness, fully conscious not incorporated in the personal consciousness. While Munsterberg finally admits the presence of co-consciousness in abnormal cases, most of his attacks upon what he calls the subconscious, are valid as against the subconscious considered as a system of separate ideas.

There are several difficulties with this explanation to be briefly noticed.

1. How can these split off ideas effect the behavior of the person? In answering this the panpsychic might

answer that as such they do not; that they are only the psychic aspect of the real phenomena. But then we might ask why it is that there is no direct causal relationship to be expressed in psychical terms, as well as in physical terms? This question may be answered, of course, but not without abandoning the strict double aspect premise.

2. From this position it is hard to explain the personal or self-consciousness. There is no escape if the position is carried to its logical conclusions, from asserting consciousness with every physiological functioning, especially of the nerves. If each atom is possessed with consciousness, then my consciousness is either the consciousness of a single atom or the compound of millions of minute consciousnesses. The difficulty arises again when we say that some person is not conscious, that a blow has rendered him unconscious. What do the adherents of the co-conscious theory mean by such a statement?

The trouble would be cleared up if they would once give up the a priori assumptions, that to be psychic is to be conscious. That there is a psychic factor present is really manifest, but there is no good reason for saying that it is consciousness of split off ideas. Even

from the double aspect view there seems to be no reason for saying that the whole of the psychic aspect is characterized by consciousness.

3. There is also a difficulty arising from the failure to distinguish the process of thinking, the mental elaboration, from the contents of consciousness.

4. In reality the split off consciousness as accompanying a distinct nerve functioning, is as different from the personal consciousness of the man or woman, as the difference between the sub-conscious mental and the conscious mental of the third theory. It does no good to arbitrarily call all 'consciousness' and then to distinguish two kinds. The two instances are as different whether we call them two kinds of consciousness or two kinds of mental operations.

5. The statement of Prince that we have as much grounds for assuming consciousness here as in another individual is sound, but where are we to stop? Why then does he divide the subconscious into the unconscious and the co-conscious? From the panpsychist view the unconscious nerve action must always be paralleled either by personal consciousness or co-consciousness apart from self consciousness. But such apparently is not the case. Prince (page 236 Unconscious) says of the brainless dog

of Rockman or of Goetz, that "hence it is a mindless physiological automaton" and (page 237) says that "many cortical processes, to be sure, are unconscious,--i.e., correlated with consciousness--but probably not all". We must give Prince credit that he endeavors to observe the facts and act in accord with them, his presupposition to the contrary, so while there may be apparent contradictions, yet he has worked in proper scientific spirit, and his conclusions are of the more value.

In spite of the above the co-conscious theory when limited to the abnormal is probably very near the truth, and if it postulated co-psychism, not necessarily consciousness, we might all agree. For the abnormal phenomena with which Prince mostly deals, we can heartily agree with the following:-

"Indeed, even when there is absence of awareness on the part of the personal consciousness, the dissociated co-consciousness may, per contra, be aware of the content of the former. For this reason, if for no other, co-consciousness is the preferable term." (Symposium, Page 96).

When the question is finally settled we can probably accept most of Dr. Prince's work as applied to the material only he has investigated. It will help finally to

(57)

establish the subconscious in the other.

III. Subconscious theory.

The third interpretation is that to which the term subconscious has been limited in this paper. In brief it states that not all mental activity is represented in consciousness, that only a part of the process is represented in consciousness. The subconscious operations are going on continuously in normal as well as abnormal conditions. It is closely connected generally with animism, vitalism or with a belief in a soul. But it no more drags the 'soul' into psychology than a discussion of any other psychical phenomenon. Because some may connect sensation with a soul does not eliminate the study of sensation from psychology.

Stated thus it is hard to see why it should be the object of such bitter attack. It lends itself readily to vitalism, ^{although it} might readily be accepted by the epiphenomenalist, interactionist, or parallelist. We have no warrant from even the materialistic standpoint, to say that all of the epiphenomena are characterized by consciousness. Many of the operations which we call intellectual may be subliminal from any point of view except one: that of the sensationalist who is tempted to dogmatize that all to which we may apply the term mental, we can also apply the term consciousness. Nor

has it any conflict with the work of Dr. Prince, except where Dr. Prince philosophises or where he applies the term conscious to the psychic factors both acknowledge to be present.

Psychology will eventually have to choose whether it will remain psychology or become physiology or biology. If it should choose to do the latter it will be of less benefit to physiology than by remaining psychology. If psychology tells us nothing of real life, then we might as well have one set of terms as another. If it does tell us something, and it should, then obviously the path should not be barred by any such assumptions as have been noted at different places in this paper. I wish to repeat that a psychic ether is as valid as any other.

It is a prevalent opinion in some quarters that the majority of psychologists and scientists have no use for the subconscious. This all too true, but largely because the question has not been properly understood, nor squarely faced. We need to be freed from our insidious network of presuppositions which are at present retarding the work of the psychologists. Nevertheless, many of the leading philosophers, psychologists and scientists of the day, believe in the subconscious

and there are many evidences that the next great movement in science will be in that direction. Therefore I shall note something of the attitude of several different men, and endeavor while doing so to sort out some of the main arguments leading to the theory of the subconscious as being the best explanation of the three classes of gaps not filled by consciousness.

1. Jastrow's book on the "Subconscious" is descriptive but greatly illuminating especially in giving examples of the great range of phenomena in which the subconscious is to be discovered. He finds a trace of the subconscious in nearly all mental activity, both normal and abnormal. Under normal consciousness he treats of absentmindedness, subconscious doing, perceiving, and elaboration ("The Subconscious", Page 120); dream factors in logical thinking and logical factors in dreaming (87), and the subconscious ~~maturing~~ of thought. He says: "The thesis implied by such terms has two aspects; first that the process of assimilation may take place with suppressed consciousness; second, that the larger part of the influences that in the end determine our mental growth may be effective without direct exposure to the searching light of conscious life" (Subconscious, Page 99). "The associative mechan-

ism finds its sphere of activity largely in the subconscious realm". (112).

Under the abnormal come dreams, altered personalities, hypnotism, hysteria, anaesthesia, automatic writing, crystal vision, trances, mathematical or poetical prodigies. Prof. Jastrow is wary of the subliminal of Myers, but seems to consider consciousness and the subconscious as only two aspects of the same unifying process. He views consciousness from the functional (Subconscious, Page 110), and evolutionary (Symposium Page 42) aspect, considers the subconscious to be an arrangement for the conservation of psychic energy." "A psychic moment is the resultant of a specifically inclined activity, reared upon a foundation of more generally conditioned influences; ***** the subconscious procedures, ***** form a corporate part of the psychic moment. Their presence is inherent in every ruffle in the stream" (420).

Like Hoffding, Hart believes "that the history of all thought has been dominated throughout by an essential tendency of the human mind, the endeavor to obtain continuity". Like Munsterberg in his general attitude toward science, he asks which of the many constructions

is the most useful for the interpretation of the observed facts, but unlike Munsterberg, he believes the subconscious is the best.

He wants us to distinguish between facts which are experienced and concepts which are not. Science deals with experience, with the content of human mind (Symposium, "Subconscious Phenomena" Page 142), and professes only to provide a "conceptual shorthand" or a "conceptual model" to enable the prediction of future occurrences. "Science is simply a method of conceiving things" (115).

"The conception of the subconscious has devised by the psychologist to explain certain psychological phenomena-- it must be regarded as a psychological conception" (123). It is an error to try to fill in the apparent gaps by resorting to physiology. Let each construction stand by itself without borrowing from the other. Memory is a concept invented to explain the continued existence of an idea (123). Both the physical and psychical explanation of memory are concepts and equally valid. He says that the psychic potential energy of an idea has as much scientific grounds as that memory may be explained by the potential physical energy of a brain cell. He makes another three-fold division of

the subconscious phenomena: 1. the marginal elements of phenomenal consciousness, referring to Stout. 2. Dissociated elements of phenomenal consciousness, including the subconscious of Jastrow and the co-conscious of Prince. 3. The non-phenomenal construction designed to explain the facts of phenomenal consciousness, referring to the unconscious of Freud.

Freud is strictly deterministic in his psychology and assigns to the Unconscious and the Fore-conscious all of the psychic factors of behavior of which we are not personally conscious. He divides the mental life into the Unconscious, which includes those unconscious desires and impulses more especially connected with the organic or vital functions, but which of themselves can never reach consciousness without a transformation; the fore-conscious which includes those factors which may or may not reach consciousness.

Perhaps the most unique part of his psychology is the part assigned to the psychic censor, which stands between the unconscious, or the fore-conscious, and the conscious. This psychic censor is a sort of private secretary or door-keeper to consciousness with instructions as to what and what not to admit to consciousness.

It has been called a pleasure-pain principle, refusing to admit the unpleasant would-be intruders, including those unworthy ones who have gained the disapprobation of the master. It is here that we find cropping out the almost inevitable dualism between two aspects of life. We cannot ignore the processes assigned to the censor because the term selected to designate them unhappily sounds like a personification. We do turn away from certain things and set up permanent inhibitions against thoughts or actions which are extremely distasteful to us.

Some of his followers claim that he has introduced a dynamical psychology. His theories are based on a strict continuity of the organic or vital processes. While he has gone to great extremes, yet I believe we must admit that he has made a very thorough and original treatment of a very fertile field, and I believe that he is now a sign-post pointing to a new era in psychology. It is a work of too momentous importance for any psychology to ignore except at its peril.

McDougal in his "Psychology" discusses the following four classes of subconscious phenomena, under the heading of the supernormal, as opposed to the sub-normal, and as distinct from the co-conscious.

1. "Subconscious operations producing results similar

to those of normal thinking." This is evidenced by hypnosis, especially post-hypnotic suggestion, and by automatic writing. In post-hypnotic suggestion the subject is told that he will do a certain thing at a certain time, and is awakened before the time arrives but nevertheless does as he was told, not being able to give any reason for doing so, "Here then in indisputable evidence that a train of purposive mental activity, which controls to some extent the behavior of the subject, may go on while he is consciously thinking of other matters".

2. Supernormal manifestations in the domain of intellect and character including the works of genius, religious conversion, and mystical experience. "Whoever has made on the spur of the moment a witty remark will probably be prepared on reflection to acknowledge that the words sprang to his lips without any deliberate search for them, and that the mental processes, the assimilation of two seemingly unlike things, or relations, or what not, accomplished itself in secret, the result only coming to consciousness as the words issued from the lips; and he may subsequently have found, somewhat to his surprise, that there was more in his remark than he at first realized",

He believes in sudden religious experiences that the good seed has been sown and has ripened in secret, and that such experiences are generally preceded by a

period of religious longing or unrest, which has produced an unconscious conative tendency.

3. "Supernormal influence of the mind over the body." Here he says that "the effects of hypnotic suggestion provide the one sure evidence that mental influences upon the bodily processes may go far beyond the normal or the ordinarily recognized".

4. Supernormal processes of communication between mind and mind. For telepathy he says that "the evidence--would suffice to establish the fact in dispute for all normal minds were it not that the question is of such momentous importance?but pleads for suspended judgement." Empirical support for the belief in the communication with the divine mind is sought along two lines chiefly. First it is argued that the processes of religious conversion is often one that cannot be accounted in terms of the known properties of the human mind in general and of the mental peculiarities of the persons concerned. Secondly, it is pointed out that in all ages the specifically religious experiences of men brought up under the most diverse traditions, have certain features in common which mark them as the work of a common influence and point to their determination from a common source". Referring to William James, "he suggested that we may regard all minds as connected in some immediate fashion which permits of their reciprocal influence and of the conjunction of their

powers; that all mind, human and infra-human as well as super-human mind, is one and that our individual minds are but partial manifestations of the one mind, conditioned by the peculiarities of our bodily organisms".

Whatever our attitude toward this it reveals a tendency of thought which is also exhibited when Dr. G. S. Hall says that probably much of the impetus toward the study of astrology and astronomy is on account of "an unconscious orientation of the mind towards its pristine and also its ultimate home", the only difference being in the nature of that ultimate home, and in its relation to our individual minds. Mankind feels that there is some relation, but whatever it is it works subconsciously in us. Hoffding defines religion as a "cosmic vital feeling".

This brings up the question of man's relation to the universe. We can hardly deny that there may be many cosmical forces which determine our behavior, or our experiences, the sources and the nature of which is beyond our comprehension. It may not make very much difference whether we call it physical or psychical. While I am not trying to argue either way on the question of telepathy, yet I hardly see how the most thorough mechanistic interpretation of life can deny its possibility. If molecular vibrations which are physical can produce a sensation of smell, why is telepathy impossible?

For mind is here considered on a mechanical basis. If mind or consciousness is the product of the impressions of different vibrations in the air or ether, how can we be sure that we know all these vibrations or the causes back of them? But there is a tremendous gap between the vibrations and the sensations.

So if we carry mechanical principles over into the mental realm we cannot deny the possibility of telepathy. But if we halt in the application of the physical explanation when we come to the conscious sensation, then other factors must enter which lie beyond the scope of physics, and we can hardly fall back on physics to say what may and what may not take place in this other realm. Physics cannot therefore determine the influences or the activities of any sort, of a principle in this realm. Obviously then on this second of the two alternatives, physics has nothing to say as to the activities or the inter-relationships in this psychic or spiritual universe.

In either case then physics cannot deny the possibility of telepathy. Of course this does not prove the fact of its existence.

The work and influence is in support of the sub-conscious interpretation, although he uses the term "Unconscious". He says; "To explore the sacred depths

of the Unconscious, to labor in what I have just called the subsoil of consciousness, that will be the principle task of psychology in the century which is opening. I do not doubt that wonderful discoveries await it there, as important, perhaps as have been in the preceding centuries the discoveries of the physical and natural sciences". (The birth of the dream, Independent, Oct 30, 1913.)

In "Matter and Memory" he says that "our unwillingness to conceive unconscious mental states is due, above all, to the fact that we hold consciousness to be the essential property of psychical states: so that a psychical state cannot, it seems, cease to be conscious without ceasing to exist. But if consciousness be but the characteristic note of the present, that is to say of the actually lived, in short of the active, then that which does not act may cease to belong to consciousness, without therefore ceasing to exist in some manner. In other words, in the psychological domain, consciousness may not be the synonym of existence, but only of real action or of immediate efficacy" (pg 181).

One of the reasons for this position is that "there will no longer be any more reason to say that the past effaces itself as soon as perceived, than to suppose that material objects cease to exist when we perceive them" (182). Also; "the idea of an unconscious representation is clear, despite current prejudices; we may even say that we make constant use of it, and that there is no conception more

familiar to common sense. For everyone admits that the images actually present to our perception are not the whole of the matter" (183). "How comes it then that an existence outside of consciousness appears clear to us in the case of objects, but obscure when we are speaking of the subject? Our perceptions, actual and virtual, extend along two lines, the one horizontal, AB, which contains all simultaneous objects in space, the other vertical, CL, on which are ranged our successive recollections set out in time. The point I at the intersection of the two lines, is the only one actually given to consciousness. Whence comes it that we do not hesitate to posit the reality of the whole line \overline{AB} , although it remains unperceived, while, on the contrary, of the line CI, the present I which is actually perceived is the only one which appears to us really to exist"? We are not here concerned with the answer to this question, but it is enough to note that for Bergson the whole of the one line is as real as the other. Practically the whole of Bergson's treatment of memory depends on the existence of a subconscious (unconscious) mental existence.

The work of the Vitalists is in harmony with the subconscious position. The subconscious theory will likely be accepted by all those who believe that they are something more than a molecular machine. McDougal's whole argument for 'Animism' in "Body and Mind" is an argument for the subconscious.

There is no need to do more than refer to the familiar arguments from the effects upon behavior or upon ideas by subliminal stimuli, or the familiar discussion of marginal consciousness, nor the proofs offered for the existence of subliminal sensations as presented by Fechner and others.

A more complete list of those men whose influence is favorable to the subconscious interpretation, would include William James, James Ward, Sir Oliver Lodge, Binet, Sidis, and Dr. Schofield.

The End.

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